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Demographic change and the rising demand for highly qualified labor in Germany 
attracts notice to the analysis of immigration. In addition, the pattern of immigration 
changed markedly during the past decades. Therefore we use the latest data of the 
German Socioeconomic Panel up to the year 2006 in order to investigate the 
economic performance of immigrants. We perform regressions of three pooled cross 
sections (1986, 1996, 2006) to estimate assimilation and quality of immigrants as 
reflected by their earnings. Further we take the heterogeneity of immigrants into 
account by separating them by country of origin. The rising wage inequality in 
Germany since the mid nineties will also be considered. We find a negative wage gap 
and a yearly assimilation rate of 2.3 percent. Due to a changing immigration pattern 








Globalization brought a deterioration of the economic position of low qualified 
workers and an increased need for human capital. In combination with the 
demographic development of many industrialized countries, immigration policy is 
becoming an important instrument for economic growth. The goal should be to 
attract and successfully integrate highly qualified “white collar” workers and try to 
retain the “blue collar” workers.  
As a result of the compressed earnings distribution in Germany compared to other 
industrial, emerging and developing countries and due to the beneficial social 
security system, Germany attracts less qualified immigrants (see Borjas (1987), pp. 
532-534; Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006), p. 1). After the huge influx of guest workers 
between 1961 and 1973, due to a strong demand for relative unskilled workers, 
Germany became an immigration country like Australia, Canada and the United 
States. During the first oil crisis the hiring of guest workers ended with a recruitment 
ban and a period mainly dominated by family reunification began. Since 1989 the 
fall of the “Iron Curtain” defined the picture of immigration. During that time a large 
remigration of ethnic Germans and immigration from former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe took place and changed the pattern of immigration origin markedly 
(see Zimmermann et al. (2006), pp. 16-29). 
Today, Germany faces a high level of low qualified unemployed and the need for a 
positive immigration balance in order to soften the ageing of the German population. 
Particularly the need for high qualified workers is of crucial importance. According 
to the OECD study on migration even the highly qualified immigrants have a higher 2 
 
probability of becoming unemployed than Germans obtaining the same educational 
level (see OECD (2007)). This highlights the importance of labour market efficiency 
as reflected by the possibility to absorb the new immigrants and successfully 
overcome demographic change. The intensity, the arrival, the quality and the 
assimilation of immigrants differ strongly between economies and are important 
parameters for assessing the success of immigration. If the new immigrants are not 
successfully integrated they are an additional burden for the public welfare system. 
For the first time, Chiswick (1978) analyzed the assimilation of immigrants as 
reflected by their earnings using the 1970 Census for the United States. Chiswick 
indicated an initial wage gap of immigrants relative to natives of 17 per cent. 10-15 
years after immigration the earnings of the immigrants equal the natives’ and start to 
exceed them with each year of labour experience in the host country. Thus the 
assimilation rate corresponds to the variable years since migration, sometimes called 
years of residence. The theoretical explanations are twofold: Initially, immigrants 
earn less than natives because they have lower country specific human capital like 
labour market customs, language skills and business practices. Each subsequent year 
that immigrants build up country specific skills is rewarded by the labour market. 
Therefore they experience steeper earnings growth compared to natives which leads 
to a narrowed gap. The argument explaining the immigrants’ wages exceeding the 
natives’ ones derives from selection. The decision to emigrate and start a new life 
allow the immigrants to become a positive selected group that is more ambitious to 
work harder and longer (see Borjas (1994), pp. 1671f.; Carliner (1980), pp. 88f.; 
Chiswick (1978), pp. 899-901). Chisiwick’s seminal article was followed by a huge 
literature (Borjas (1985, 1987, 1989, 1995); Chiswick (1986); LaLonde and Topel 
(1990, 1991)) on the assimilation hypothesis for immigrants in the United States.  3 
 
Different empirical approaches to the study of immigrants’ assimilation can be found 
in the literature. Chiswick (1978) used a cross-sectional standard OLS estimation of 
the human capital earnings function
1 to estimate the assimilation of immigrants in 
the USA.
2 A correlation of the year since migration variable and the wage of 
immigrants could be caused by either age (assimilation) or cohorts effects (quality 
change). If the less successful have a higher propensity to remigrate or the most 
recent immigration cohorts have a lower unobserved ability relevant for the labor 
market, the simple OLS cross-section estimation of the assimilation is biased 
upwards. To account for this bias, the cohort effects have to be taken into 
consideration. Because of identification problems the separation of age and cohorts 
effects is not possible with single cross section estimation. Cohort or longitudinal 
data are necessary for this kind of analysis. Borjas (1985, 1995) uses different cross-
sections in his estimations. Assuming the same period effect for immigrants and 
natives, it is possible to identify age and cohort effects simultaneously. This 
approach poses problems due to selective emigration, changes in the composition of 
the samples over time and the difficulty of disentangling longitudinal changes and 
period effects (Chiswick et. al (2002), p. 1). Instead of using different cross-sections 
with the restriction of the same period effects, panel data techniques could be used. 
Borjas (1989) and Hu (2000) estimated a system of natives and immigrants human 
capital functions using longitudinal data. The main problem using panel data 
techniques is panel attrition. Panel attrition will bias the estimation results if the 
probability to leave the sample is systematically linked to labor market 
developments. 
                                                            
1   See Mincer (1974) for a theoretical derivation of the human captial earnings function. 
2   Carlinger (1980) and De Freitas (1980) use also a simple cross section estimation of the 
assimilation of immigrants in the USA.   4 
 
Because of the high panel data attrition of the immigrants in the German 
socioeconomic panel (GSOEP) we do not use panel data techniques.
3 Instead, we use 
a similar empirical framework as Borjas (1985, 1995) to identify assimilation and 
cohort effects of immigrants in Germany simultaneously.  
For Germany, Pischke (1992) analyzed the assimilation of guestworkers using data 
from the GSOEP 1984-1989 and different estimation methods. Pooled cross-section 
and panel estimates yield similar results indicating no assimilation. After controlling 
for different variables, the assimilation effect is insignificant and negative, indicating 
lower earnings growth for immigrants than for Germans. Dustmann (1993) differs 
between temporary and permanent migrants using the expected length of stay 
variable to disentangle. Estimating a cross-section of the 1984 wave of the GSOEP, 
Dustmann found a positive but insignificant yearly assimilation rate. The absent 
significant assimilation is explained with the low incentive of temporary migrants to 
invest into host country specific human capital. Licht and Steiner (1994) perform 
fixed effects panel estimates based on the first six waves of the GSOEP. They found 
no evidence of the assimilation hypothesis. Schmidt (1997) compared the 
assimilation of ethnic Germans and German guest workers and couldn’t find a stable 
pattern. His analysis was based on cross-sections from two different sources, from 
which one was the GSOEP wave 1984. Bauer et al. (2005) couldn’t support the 
assimilation hypothesis either. However, Constant and Massey (2005) found a 
positive assimilation rate that equates the earnings of immigrants and natives after 17 
to 23 years analyzing the GSOEP waves from 1984-1997. Most recently, Fertig and 
Schurer (2007) analyzed the assimilation hypothesis using a longitudinal panel data 
                                                            
3  A balanced panel would contain 1288 (1015 natives and 273 immigrants) individuals over the 
period of 23 years. After correcting for missing values and our data selection we would have only 
207 (180 natives and 27 immigrants) individuals. 5 
 
set of 21 waves lasting from 1984 to 2004. They estimated the assimilation for four 
different entry cohorts in order to control for immigrant heterogeneity using fixed 
effects models. They found positive assimilation rates for two cohorts lasting 9 and 
16 years, respectively. Summing up the existing literature, there is no consistent 
picture about the catching up process. However a large initial earnings differential in 
Germany exists. Further there is no unambiguous evidence about the development of 
cohort quality so far.   
This paper uses the latest data of the GSOEP to estimate the earnings equations in a 
pooled cross section of the years 1986, 1996 and 2006 and thus incorporates the 
development of the changing immigration pattern of the past 15 years. Further we 
want to account for the changing wage structure that occurred in Germany at the end 
of the 20
th century (see Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006); Peters (2007)).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
underlying data and some stylized facts. We will exhibit the wage differential 
between immigrants and Germans for each survey year and different immigrant 
cohorts. The changing and group-specific differently affecting wage structure will be 
accounted for by using two different wage deflators. The empirical model will be 
compiled in section 3. After discussing the different model specifications and the 





2. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
For the analysis we use the GSOEP, collected for the period 1984 through 2006. The 
GSOEP is a yearly conducted household survey.
4 The data we are using are limited 
to men, aged 18-65, working at least 1820 hours per year with an hourly wage higher 
than 1€ and living in West Germany
5. The individual real hourly wages are 
calculated deflating the nominal yearly labor earnings by the harmonized consumer 
price index based on the year 2000 and divided by yearly hours worked. We are 
focusing on three cross sections, derived from the latest one in year 2006, 1996 and 
1986, respectively. After correction for individuals exhibiting missing values the 
2006 wave consists of 2576 natives and 431 immigrants (1996: 1916, 688; 1986: 
2255, 1011).
6 As can be seen from table 1 the natives earn 2.0 € more than 
immigrants in the year 2006. Twenty years before both groups earned approximately 
26 per cent less. Respectively, the absolute wage increase is higher for natives 
compared to immigrants. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The age composition of immigrants and natives is quite stable in both 1986 and 1996 
but rose considerably for the last period. Since the individual investment in formal 
education is an important factor determining the wage level, the change in the 
                                                            
4  See Wagner et al. (2007) and Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) for a detailed description of the 
GSOEP. 
5  The immigration sample D for the period 1984-1993 is restricted to West Germany due to few 
observations in the eastern states of Germany. See Pannenberg et al. (2005), p. 180. 
6   See Appendix A1 for the variables of the GSOEP we are using. 7 
 
educational pattern of natives and immigrants affects the wage differential between 
both groups. For example, if the educational level of natives vis à vis immigrants 
increases, the immigrants fall behind even if they exhibit an increase their selves. 
The general expansion of the educational level is expressed for natives and 
immigrants regarding the increase of the years of schooling variable for the period 
1986 through 2006. The educational level of natives exceeds that of immigrants for 
approximately 1.5 years. For a more detailed assessment we turn to educational 
attainment. Higher education yields higher returns to skill. Accordingly, the highest 
educational attainment is critical. The fraction of higher education for Germans is 8.9 
percent higher than for immigrants and increased stronger in the period we observed. 
In this sense, the quality of immigrants and their skill distribution relative to natives 
declined during the past two decades. The fact that the GSOEP oversamples the 
guest workers who started to immigrate in the late 1950s results in the high value of 
the years since migration variable.
7 The age at immigration variable accounts for the 
fact that younger immigrants can better build up country specific human capital as 
pointed out by Friedberg (1993). The age at immigration in our sample is declining 
by four years. 
 
To take into consideration the heterogeneity of immigrants, table 2 displays the 
stylized facts for immigrants differentiated by country of origin. We separated four 
country groups: High income countries according to the classification of the World 
Bank, Turkey because of their high share of the population in Germany, ethnic 
                                                            
7  The high value of the ysm variable indicates the problem of the GSOEP that the bulk of the 
assimilation process of the relatively old guestworkers may be already over (see also Pischke 
(1992), p. 12). 8 
 
Germans because of their huge influx after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the low 
income countries (also according to the classification of the World Bank).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As expected, the mean real hourly wage of immigrants from the high income 
countries is highest and the one of the low income countries the lowest. The ethnic 
Germans hold the highest educational level followed by high income countries, and 
Turkey ranking last. The high level of years since migration for the high income 
countries can be explained by the high share of guestworkers in this group. The other 
groups exhibit four to five years less. The Turkish immigrants arrived youngest. 
 
Immigrants earn less than natives, because they don´t have specific skills required by 
the labor market of the host country.
8 The negative log hourly wage gap of 
immigrants vis à vis natives increased from 5.4 percent in the year 1986 to 16.8 
percent in the year 1996 and remained at this level in 2006. The declining quality of 
immigrants due to the changed pattern of the immigration in Germany during the 
period from 1950 to 2006 can be seen as a possible reason for the widening wage 
gap. We separated the immigrants into five different decennial cohorts. Table 3, left 
side, exhibits the regression results of log hourly wages on dummy variables for each 
decennial arrival cohort. The most recent arrival cohort in each cross section exhibits 
the highest wage differential relative to natives. For the year 2006 the wage gap of 
the latest immigrant cohort was 41.8 percent. Compared to this the cohort in 1996 
earned 34.2 percent less and in 1986 14.6 percent less. Thus, the cohort quality 
                                                            
8   Another reason might be discrimination of immigrants (see Constant and Massey (2005)). 9 
 
seems to decline. The prior to 1966 cohort is the only one with a positive wage gap 
relative to natives. Tracking this cohort over each cross section exhibits a widening 
of the positive wage gap by 12.8 percent. The effect of the wage increase relative to 
natives can be observed for all cohorts compared from 1986 to 2006 – indicating a 
higher ageing or assimilation effect. It is not possible to compare the arrival cohorts 
in each single cross section, because the widening of the wage gap could stem from 
both changes in quality and age.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In order to make this comparison possible we assessed the age-adjusted wage 
differential by adding the age variable up to the third order to the regression (see 
table 3, right side). The development of the wage gap between immigrants and 
natives keeps almost stable. By 1986, the positive wage gap of the prior 1966 cohort 
turned negative, because of the higher age compared to the reference group. Tracking 
the cohorts over time yields qualitatively similar results for the prior to 1966 and the 
1986-1995 cohorts. The uneven pattern for the 1966-1975 and 1976-1985 cohort can 
be explained with their younger age structure relative to the rest. The comparison of 
cohort quality within each cross sectional is now possible. The cohort quality is 
declining through all cross sections except for the 1976-1985 cohort. By 2006, the 
relative negative wage gap between the oldest and the youngest cohort is 36.8 
percent and between the worst cohort and the natives it is almost 30 percent. 
 
After a stable wage distribution until the mid nineties Germany experienced a 
widening of the wage structure thereafter. The upper half of the wage structure is 10 
 
widening since the mid nineties and the lower half since the end of the nineties (see 
Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006); Peters (2007)). Especially return to skill regarding the 
highest educational attainment is rising relative to lower educational attainments. 
Since immigrants are less qualified than natives, this can result in an underestimation 
of assimilation. The mean educational level of Germans is higher than the mean 
educational level of immigrants. Thus, a rise in the returns to skill leads to a 
widening wage gap between Germans and immigrants – even in the absence of 
changes in the relative skills of the groups –  and prolongs the assimilation period. In 
this sense, the differences in earnings between immigrants and natives may reflect 
changes in the skill distribution and not time residing in Germany. To account for 
this fact, we use two different ways to deflate the wage. First we use the age-
education deflator (see for similar procedure Borjas (1995)), second the percentile 
deflator (see for similar procedure LaLonde and Topel (1990)). 
 
The age-education deflator nets out the changes in the native wage structure coming 
from changes due to returns to skill and age. In this sense, we expect a narrowing of 
the wage gap when comparing the change of the cross sections 2006 and 1996 
relative to the not deflated wage gap change. Therefore we segmented the native 
population and built two age and six education cells. The age group separates 
individuals above and below 40 years. The education cells are built according to 
ISCED-1997-Classification. This yields 12 age-education cells.
9 To calculate the 
deflator in equation (1) for age cell a and education cell e we subtracted the mean log 
hourly wage (lhwage) of each age-education cell of base year 1986 from the 
corresponding wage of the cross sections 1996 and 2006.  
                                                            




Finally, we subtract the deflator ( ) in equation (2) from the log hourly wage and 
receive the age-education deflated log real hourly wage ( ). 
 
This deflator has the advantage to account for the rising wage inequality between 
age-education cells. Unfortunately we cannot control for changes within groups. 
With the percentile deflator we can control these within group changes. To account 
for changes of the natives wage distribution the log real hourly wage will be deflated 
using the changes of each decile i of the cross sections relative to the base year 1986. 
To set up the percentile deflator ( ) we proceed similar as before (equation (3)).  
 
In equation (4) we calculate the percentile deflated log real hourly wage by 
subtracting the percentile deflator from the log real hourly wage for each census 
year. 
 
The assumption that natives and immigrants are equally skilled at each decile is a 
problematic facet of this deflator. We might face the problem that newly arrived 
immigrants experience wage disadvantages because they lack country specific skills. 
Thus, they are in different deciles although they have the same skill level. In this 12 
 
sense, none of the deflators can completely capture the changes of the native wage 
structure affecting immigrants. 
 
Table 4 incorporates the changes of the wage structure of natives when calculating 
the immigrant wage differential. The left side depicts the wage gap using the age-
education-deflator.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Focusing on the period when Germany experienced the widening wage structure we 
compare the change of the wage differential between 2006 and 1996. As expected 
above, the wage gap of all immigrants declined by 3.8 percent, whereas the 
immigrants experienced an increase of 0.5 percent using the not deflated wage 
differential. The pattern of a narrowing wage gap between 2006 and 1996 remains 
stable for all cohorts. Using the percentile deflator (right side) yields qualitatively 
comparable results regarding the narrowing wage gap change between the relevant 
years 2006 and 1996.  
 
Summing up, we find that immigrants from the cohort 1996-2006 and 1986-1995 are 
the least qualified as reflected by their earnings gap. The earliest cohort performs 




3. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
3.1 Econometric Specification   
After the descriptive analysis we turn to a regression analysis in order to further 
assess the performance of the immigrants. Mincer (1974) was the first who uses the 
classic Mincer equation to determine individual earnings. We augmented this 
equation with more socioeconomic and immigrant specific variables to account for 
observable differences in characteristics.  
In our basic regression the endogenous variable is the log real hourly wage lhwage.
10 
We regress lhwage on the following exogenous variables. The socioeconomic 
variables for both natives and immigrants are educational attainment according to 
ISCED-1997-Classification dummies dik (k=1,2,4,5,6)
11 and marital status dummy 
dm. We also used regional dummies to control for regional wage disparities between 
north drn, south drs and middle of West Germany being the reference category. 
Mincerian Experience
12 ex and quadratic values of Mincerian Experience are 
estimated separately for natives and immigrants. Further we use immigrant specific 
variables. To determine the assimilation affect we use the years since migration 
variable ysm up to the third order that counts the years an immigrant resides in 
Germany. The third order polynomial is done to account for the nonlinear wage 
growth with more years since migration. The year since migration variable is 
                                                            
10  We use the log real hourly wage in order to eliminate the influence of working time on wages. 
11  We use the ISCED-1997-Classification instead of years of schooling because there is no linear 
relationship between years of schooling and wage. Each further step in educational attainment 
yields a disproportionate wage increase. 
12  Mincer (1974) defined potential job experience as age-years of schooling-6. 14 
 
calculated as year of questionnaires minus year of migration.
13 Immigrants catch up 
vis à vis natives if the experience plus the year since migration effect exceeds the 
experience effect of natives. The changing cohort quality is captured by five cohort 
dummy variables (d66: prior to 1966, d76: 1966-1975, d86: 1976-1985, d96: 1986-
1995, d06: 1996-2006) interacted with an immigration dummy (dn).
14 The intention 
to stay in Germany is reflected by the question on the expected duration of stay. The 
dummy variable dstay takes the value one if the immigrant wants to stay forever. 
This controls at least for some of the remigration problem. The error term u catches 
all unobserved characteristics and is normally identically independently distributed.  
We included period dummies to sweep out time effects (dc96, dc06) of business 
cycle variation. According to our dummy selection the base period is 1986. 
Simultaneously estimating the period, cohort and assimilation effect yields an 
identification problem. The identification problem is a result of the assimilation 
effect being a linear combination of period and cohort effects. Since we want to 
concentrate on cohort and assimilation effects, we have to impose the identifying 
restriction of period effects equally affecting natives and foreigners on the model. 
The intercept   indicates the log real hourly wage of a native without experience, an 
educational attainment of middle vocational, not married, from the mid of Germany 
and from cross-sectional 1986.  
                                                            
13    We also used a linear and quadratic specification, but a third order polynomial better fits the 
characteristics of years since migration and wage relationship traced over the years.  
14  We also used a different cohort classification according to Zimmermann et al. (2006) reflecting the 
different immigration periods. The results are robust to ours, but we used decennial cohort 
classification to better compare the cohorts between and within the three cross section exhibiting a 
ten year intervall as well. 15 
 
 
 We pooled the data of the three cross sections of 2006, 1996 and 1986 and estimate 
the following basic equation (5) with OLS. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity 
we use White consistent standard errors (see White (1980)). 
3.2 Estimation Results 
Table 5 depicts the regression results of the variables of interest.
15 In regression (1) 
to (4) the endogenous variable is each the log real hourly wage but four different sets 
of exogenous variables. To net out the changes in the wage structure we used age-
education deflated and percentile deflated log real hourly wage for the regression (5) 
to (8) and (9) to (12), respectively. For each wage specification the regression results 
from column (1) through (12) remain robust considering the socioeconomic variables 
ex, dik (k=1,2,4,5,6), dm, drs and drn (see Appendix table A2).  
[Table 5 about here] 
Column (1) describes the simplest specification of the regression of the log real 
hourly wage on quadratic experience, educational attainment, marital status, period 
effects, immigrant dummy, years since migration and a constant. We find a negative 
wage gap of immigrants relative to natives of 40.6 percent. The immigrants reduce 
this wage gap with a yearly assimilation rate of 3.2 percent.
16 The period effects are 
                                                            
15  For more detailed regression results see Appendix table 2. 
16  In table 5 we calculated the effect of one more year of ysm on the wage. We are aware of our 
calculation error stemming from using this assimilation rate instead of the correctly use of the 
estimated coefficients of the third order ysm polynomial. This error is negligible if the percental 
change is small.    16 
 
both positive and highly significant. In column (2) we split the immigrants by time of 
arrival and add cohort dummies in order to control the declining productivity of the 
most recent immigrants as noted above. Further we included dstay to control the 
problem of remigration. The inclusion of the cohorts yields considerably different 
negative wage gaps and reduces the assimilation rate by 0.8 percent, as expected 
from theoretical considerations above.
17 Yet, adding cohorts reduces the significance 
of the years since migration variable. We can confirm the results of the above 
descriptive analysis. The cohort quality is declining in the following order: d66, d86, 
d76, d96 and d06. However, the results for d76 and d86 are not significant. The 
declining cohort quality explains the reduction of the assimilation effect. Without 
controlling for cohorts the assimilation effect in column (1) was biased upwards. The 
influence of the remigration decision is negative but insignificant. The negative sign 
suggests a negative remigration selection. Regression (3) controls for regional 
disparities (see Appendix table A2 for details). As expected, individuals from the 
northern part earn less than individuals from the middle. Individuals from the south 
earn more, though this effect is insignificant. In addition, the d76 cohort turns 
significant. All remaining results stay robust. Column (4) represents our basic model 
from equation (5). We controlled for different labor market experience depending on 
being native or immigrant. There is no significant difference in the experience effect 
                                                            
17  In several other specifications in order to check for robustness we also estimated regression (2) 
without dstay. The main changes on ysm stem from the cohort dummies. 17 
 
for natives and immigrants.
18 Immigrants from the d66 cohort earn 13.7 percent and 
from d76 24.1 percent less than natives. The negative wage gap for d86 is 
insignificant. The d96 and d06 cohorts are the worst earning 41.3 percent and 55.8 
percent less than Germans respectively. Not differentiating after cohorts, the yearly 
assimilation rate of immigrants is 2.2 percent.
19  
According to the Akaike information criterion, the value of the adjusted R-squared 
and the inclusion of all relevant variables we chose model (4) as our preferred 
reference model. In column (5) to (8) and (9) to (12) we proceeded with our 
specifications identically to column (1) to (4) but used the age-education deflated log 
real hourly wage and percentile deflated real log hourly wage as endogenous 
variable. Comparing both the results in column (5) to (8) and column (9) to (12) we 
have qualitatively similar effects on the results by adding new exogenous variables 
as for the not deflated wage. Thus, we concentrate on a comparison of specification 
(8) and (12) with the one in (4). The age-education deflator sweeps out the period 
effects. As expected, we find a higher assimilation rate of 2.3 percent for the age-
education adjusted wage structure. The wage gap of the different cohorts in column 
(8) declined slightly compared to column (4). The d06 cohort earns 52.6 percent less 
than natives; immigrants who arrived between 1986 and 1995 earned 38.5 percent 
less. All other results are robust. To illustrate the catching up of immigrants, figure 1 
                                                            
18  Further we interacted the educational attainment, the marital status and the regional disparities with 
the immigrant dummy. All interacted expressions were insignificant meaning no difference 
between natives and immigrants. All other variables were robust. So we used the simpler 
specifications in table 5. According to Friedberg (1993) age at migration has an influence on 
wages. For all specifications we controlled for age at migration. To add the age at migration 
variable we had to impose on the model a second identifying restriction of equal experience effects 
for natives and immigrants. The variable has the theoretically expected negative sign but is 
insignificant throughout all regressions. All other results were not affected.   
19  We did not add interaction between both cohorts and years since migration and experience because 
of the heterogeneity within each cohort yielding biased results. However, as we focus on changing 
cohort quality the mean rate of assimilation and experience is sufficient. 18 
 
depicts the experience-earnings profiles of immigrants vs. natives (left side) and of 
each immigrant cohort vs. natives (right side). According to figure 1, immigrants 
assimilate vis à vis natives due to a steeper experience-earnings profile, yet they 
never equal native earnings. When differentiating for cohorts we can clearly identify 
the different cohort quality. As a result, the d66, d76 and d86 could fully catch up to 
native earnings when assuming the average immigrant assimilation rate. Due to their 
low quality, the d96 and d06 cohorts never achieve this.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Using the percentile deflated wage yields qualitatively worse results. The period 
effect dc96 is insignificant and the period effect dc06 is negative. Between 1986 and 
1996 the wage distribution shifts to the right for about 16 percent at all deciles. From 
1986 to 2006 the shift is more unequal. The wage distribution rises almost gradually 
from 20 percent at the first decile to 29 percent at the ninth decile. The wage increase 
used for deflation turned the period effect 2006 significantly negative. Because 
immigrants are located more on the left side of the wage distribution, the negative 
wage gap increases for approximately one percent in column (12) relative to column 
(4). As expected, the year since migration variable increases slightly in column (9). 
For all other specifications the year since migration variable turns out to be 
insignificant. Still cohort quality reduces significantly throughout the immigration 
period and the negative difference is augmented compared to not deflated results.
20 
We suspect either the period or cohort effects to reduce the significance of the year 
since migration variable. 
                                                            
20  We suspect the increasing wage gap to be caused by a rising wage inequality within education and 
age groups. 19 
 
In the following empirical specification we allow differences among immigrants in 
country of origin. This is done because of the influence of the heterogeneity of 
immigrants on the results. Therefore we added four country dummies instead of the 
immigrant dummy. If immigrants come from high income countries we introduced 
dic, from Turkey dtur, from low income countries dlic. For ethnic Germans we set up 
deg. We also controlled for the interaction of these dummies with experience and 
years since migration, respectively. We drop the cohort dummies because the 
interaction with the country of origin dummies would result, for some interactions, 
into too few observations for a reliable estimation. The cohort quality aspect is 
negligible if using heterogeneous country cohorts. This is particularly applicable, 
because the bulk of the immigrants from dlic immigrated within the d76 cohort, from 
deg within the d96 cohort, dtur within d76 and d86 and finally dic within the d66 and 
d76 cohort. Accordingly, the most recent cohorts consist mainly of deg as a result of 
the opening up of Eastern Europe. The d86 consists of dtur as reflecting the period of 
family reunification; the d76 consists of dlic, dtur and dic, thus representing mainly 
the guest workers. Finally, the d66 represents mainly the earliest guest workers from 
classical guest worker countries, namely Italy, Spain and Greece. In this sense, there 
already is a timely order inherent in the construction of the country dummies 
reflecting the changing immigration pattern in Germany. As proceeded before, we 
use the same three endogenous variables and tested different specifications for the 
robustness of our results. The socioeconomic variables are robust for the different 
specifications, likewise. After robustness check our preferred models are column 
(14), (16) and (18) where we concentrate on the assimilation and quality of 
immigrants. The results are shown in table 6.   
 [Table 6 about here] 20 
 
We now turn to column (13) where we used the simplest specification. The results 
indicate a negative wage gap over all immigration groups, explicitly 55.4 percent for 
low income countries, 39.9 percent for ethnic Germans, 38.5 percent for Turks and 
26.2 percent for high income countries. The mean yearly assimilation rate is 3.2 
percent. In column (14) we allow immigration group specific experience and years 
since migration profiles. We obtain an insignificant and the smallest negative wage 
gap for the immigrants from high income countries. This may result because they 
attain similar characteristics as natives relevant for the labor market and come from 
an industrial country comparable to Germany. The older immigrants from high 
income countries came mainly as guest workers to Germany, whereas the younger 
immigrants are not guest workers coming from industrial countries. They have a 
positive assimilation. Compared to the industrial countries, Turkey is economically 
behind. Thus, they have a high but insignificant negative wage gap. There is no proof 
of a catching up process. Ethnic Germans emigrated from Eastern Europe are 
supposed to have a slightly negative wage gap due to unequal educational systems 
compared with industrial countries. However the wage gap might remain small 
because of being enrooted to Germany. Compared to German wage growth they are 
falling behind. The last group of immigrants from low income countries should have 
the highest negative wage gap because they are negatively selected due to the very 
high wage inequality compared to Germany. Indeed they have a significant large 
negative wage gap, but a high positive and significant assimilation rate.  
Using the age-education deflator (column (16)) we obtain better results considering 
the adjusted R-squared and the information criterion. Compared to column (14), we 
expect an adjustment of the wage gap as well as the assimilation rate according to the 
development of the age-education distribution of specific immigrant groups 21 
 
compared to natives. In general, the assimilation rate should increase as it turns out 
to be for dic, dtur and dlic. Except the marginal changes due to the deflation the 
results of the wage gap remain qualitatively stable. We obtain a positive assimilation 
rate of 4.9 percent for high income countries, of 10.5 percent for low income 
countries and a negative rate of 1.4 percent for ethnic Germans. In the case of high 
and low income countries there is a significant difference compared to natives 
regarding the experience effect. The Turks exhibit a positive but insignificant 
assimilation rate. For the purpose of better perception of the assimilation process this 
is plotted using the experience-earnings profiles in figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Except for ethnic Germans all experience-earnings profiles are concave indicating an 
increase of earnings with years since migration at a decreasing rate. In contrast, the 
profile is convex for ethnic Germans. The immigrants from high income countries 
start with a negative wage gap, quickly assimilate and finally exceed the natives. The 
ethnic Germans equal native Germans after approximately 20 years. Immigrants 
from Turkey and low income countries exhibit the typical steeper experience-
earnings profile than Germans but never reach the same wage level. Interestingly, 
when controlling for country of origin we find a significant negative selection of 
immigrants. Individuals who want to stay permanently in Germany earn 6.7 percent 
less than individuals who want to remigrate. Thus immigrants who want to stay 
permanently might be a negative selected group with respect to wages. 
 
As in table 5, the percentile deflated model yields the worst results. As expected, the 





Our descriptive analysis of the immigrants in Germany yielded a negative and 
increasing wage gap between immigrants and natives over the period 1986 through 
2006. Differentiating for time of arrival we found a decreasing cohort quality. Earlier 
immigrants earn more than the latest immigrants coming to Germany. Due to rising 
wage inequality and especially due to the increase of the returns to skill of higher 
education Germany has experienced since the mid nineties, we used an age-
education and percentile deflator. This yielded a narrowing of the negative wage gap 
change. The latest immigrants still earned least. 
Turning to a more formal analysis we can confirm the descriptive analysis results 
reveal a negative wage gap and declining cohort quality as reflected by a rising wage 
gap. Immigrants arriving between 1986 and 1995 earn 38.5 percent less, immigrants 
arriving since 1996 earn even 52.6 percent less than natives. Compared to this, the 
earliest immigrants arriving prior to 1966 exhibited only a wage disadvantage of 8.6 
percent. Further we find an average assimilation rate of 2.3 percent. The immigrants 
arriving prior to 1986 could reach earnings equality vis à vis natives. The others, 
although exhibiting steeper experience-earnings profiles than natives, cannot fully 
catch up because of their high initial wage gap. As expected, the wage deflators 
correct for the underestimation of the assimilation rate. 
Since the pattern of immigration changed during the period of observation in 
Germany we take into account the heterogeneity of the immigration groups. Doing 
so, we find a negative wage gap for immigrants from high income countries, Turkey, 23 
 
low income countries and for ethnic Germans. But for assessing the ability to absorb 
immigrants into the labor market their assimilation is crucial. We uncovered a 
positive assimilation rate of 4.9 percent for high income countries and of 10.5 
percent for low income countries. We cannot confirm an assimilation rate for Turks. 
For ethnic Germans we show a negative yearly rate of 1.4 percent. Due to the convex 
experience-earnings profile they could assimilate after approximately 20 years.  
Owing to the deterioration of the position of low qualified as reflected by the high 
unemployment and the continuously rising demand for highly qualified the 
integration of immigrants into the labor market will be a challenge for immigration 
policy regarding declining cohort quality. This fits with the negative selection of 
immigrants we found. Permanent immigrants earn 6.7 percent less than immigrants 
who just came to Germany to improve their human capital or to work here for a part 
time of their life cycle. One possible reason for this selection could be the beneficial 
social system in Germany. This could be of interest to investigate more deeply by 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Stylized facts, differentiated by natives and immigrants 
      natives  immigrants 
        1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
observations  (numbers)  2255 1916 2576 1011  688  431 
real hourly wage (mean)  13,4 € 16,2 € 16,9 € 11,7 €  13,3 €  14,9 €
age (mean)     40,52 40,75 43,71 40,40  40,79  44,70
years of schooling (mean)  11,76 12,18 12,83 10,36  11,06  11,33
inadequately  0,8% 1,3% 1,3%  15,3%  9,4% 5,0% 
educational attainment  general elemantary 15,6% 12,3% 8,7%  24,2% 20,9% 13,4%
   middle vocational  54,3% 51,9% 45,5% 41,1%  39,4%  45,1%
   vocational plus abi 2,3%  4,8%  7,1%  7,2%  12,6%  10,9%
   higher vocational  11,7% 9,8%  10,9% 3,8%  3,1%  7,9% 
   higher education  15,4% 20,0% 26,5% 8,4%  14,6%  17,6%
years since migration (mean)  -  -  -  16,49  18,08  23,64
age at migration (mean)   -  -  -  23.38  21.63  19.56
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights.  
Table 2: Stylized facts, pooled immigrants differentiated by country of origin 
      Immigrants from 







observations (numbers)  765  559  465  341 
real hourly wage (mean)  15.07 €  11.95 € 13.79 €  10.93 € 
age (mean)  43.97  39.04  41.39  42.70 
years of schooling (mean)  10.88  9.94  11.87  10.67 
years since migration (mean)  22.45  18.24  17.91  17.03 
age at migration (mean)   21.52  20.80  23.48  25.67 
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights.  
Table 3: Immigrant wage differential 
   not age-adjusted  age-adjusted 
    1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
all immigrants  -0.054**  -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.091*** -0.151***  -0.156***
<1966  arrivals  0.069 0.134 0.197 -0.058 0.009 0.069 
1966-1975  arrivals  -0.082*** -0.121*** -0.076 -0.153*** -0.207*** -0.188 
1976-1985  arrivals  -0.146*** -0.165*** -0.038 0.034 -0.066 -0.079 
1986-1995  arrivals - -0.342*** -0.321*** - -0.221***  -0.212***
1996-2006 arrivals  -  -  -0.418*  -  -  -0.299 
Note.- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights.  26 
 
Table 4: Immigrant wage differential, age-adjusted and deflated by changes in wage 
structure 
   by age-education-deflator  by percentile-deflator 
    1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
all immigrants  -0.091*** -0.195*** -0.157*** -0.091*** -0.164***  -0.155***
<1966  arrivals  -0.058 -0.042 0.099 -0.058 0.013 0.058 
1966-1975  arrivals  -0.153*** -0.284*** -0.131 -0.153*** -0.227*** -0.182 
1976-1985  arrivals  0.034 -0.091 -0.085 0.034 -0.077 -0.075 
1986-1995  arrivals - -0.244*** -0.242*** - -0.235***  -0.213***
1996-2006  arrivals  -  - -0.311 -  - -0.313 
Note.- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 27 
 
Table 5: Regression results 
   lhwage  lhwage, using age-education deflator  lhwage, using percentile deflator 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ex  0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
dc96  0.165*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173***  -0.029  -0.020  -0.020  -0.020  0.017  0.025  0.025  0.025 
dc06  0.112*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.128*** -0.042**  -0.022  -0.024  -0.024  -0.098*** -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 
dn  -0.406***  - - -  -0.413*** - - -  -0.417*** - - - 
ex*dn  - - -  0.008  - - -  0.004  - - -  0.009 
ysm  0.032***  0.024* 0.024* 0.022*  0.034***  0.022* 0.022* 0.023*  0.035***  0.024  0.024  0.021 
d66  -  -0.075* -0.086* -0.137*  -  -0.042**  -0.051*  -0.086**  -  -0.080* -0.092* -0.147* 
d76  - -0.186  -0.193*  -0.241*** - -0.146  -0.152  -0.176 - -0.191  -0.199*  -0.250* 
d86  - -0.156  -0.159  -0.215 - -0.149  -0.152  -0.181 - -0.162  -0.167  -0.227 
d96  - -0.362***  -0.361*** -0.413*** - -0.360*** -0.358*** -0.385*** - -0.372*** -0.371*** -0.426*** 
d06  -  -0.494* -0.496* -0.558*  -  -0.493**  -0.494**  -0.526**  -  -0.521**  -0.523*  -0.591** 
dstay  - -0.049  -0.049  -0.049 - -0.051  -0.051  -0.052 - -0.048  -0.048  -0.048 
Observations  8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 
adj.  R-squared  0.297 0.299 0.300 0.300 0.311 0.313 0.314 0.314 0.279 0.281 0.282 0.282 
AIC  11627 11607 11597 11597 11542 11517 11508 11511 12273 12253 12241 12240 
Note.- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%               
In case of the aggregated effects of the variables ex, ex*dn and ysm, the total effect and the significance level of the Wald test (see appendix table A2) are 
specified. A list of the complete regression results can be found in appendix table A2. 
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 28 
 
Table 6: Regression results, country of origin 
  lhwage  lhwage, using age-education deflator  lhwage, using percentile deflator 
   (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
ex 0.056***  0.055***  0.055***  0.055***  0.056***  0.055*** 
dc96 0.167***  0.171***  -0.027 -0.023  0.019  0.023 
dc06 0.116***  0.122***  -0.039*  -0.033  -0.094***  -0.088*** 
dic -0.262***  -0.098  -0.277***  -0.125  -0.265***  -0.167 
dtur -0.385***  -0.475  -0.389***  -0.511**  -0.402***  -0.489* 
deg -0.399***  -0.128  -0.413***  -0.120  -0.412***  -0.099 
dlic -0.554***  -1.155***  -0.539***  -0.981  -0.571***  -1.167*** 
ex*dic -  -0.024*  - -0.026*  -  -0.019 
ex*dtur -  -0.007  -  -0.004 -  -0.008 
ex*deg -  0.002  -  0.003 -  0.000 
ex*dlic -  0.046***  -  0.029***  -  0.045** 
ysm   0.032***  -  0.034***  -  0.033***  - 
ysm*dic -  0.065**  - 0.075***  -  0.066** 
ysm*dtur -  0.062  -  0.065  - 0.067 
ysm*deg -  -0.013***  -  -0.014***  -  -0.019*** 
ysm*dlic -  0.074***  -  0.076*** -  0.078*** 
dstay -  -0.058  -  -0.067*  -  -0.058 
Observations 8754  8754  8754  8754  8754  8754 
adj. R-squared  0.300  0.303  0.313  0.316  0.281  0.285 
AIC 11596  11575  11518  11503  12241  12219 
Note.- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
In case of the aggregated effects of the variables ex, ex*dic,  ex*dtur, ex*deg, ex*dlic and ysm, ysm*dic, ysm*dtur, ysm*deg, ysm*dlic the total effect and the 
significance level of the Wald test (see appendix table A2) are specified. A list of the complete regression results can be found in appendix table A2. 
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 29 
 






















































































Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 











































































































Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Used variables from GSOEP and Bundesbank 
our variable names  Varname  Label 
-  IMMIYEAR    Year Of Immigration To Germany 
dn NATION$$  Nationality 
di1..di6 ISCED$$  ISCED-1997-Classification 
dstay  BISTAY      Desire To Stay In Germany 
-  D11102LL    Gender of Individual 
age  D11101$$  Age of Individual     
dm  D11104$$  Marital Status of Individual 
-  D11109$$  Number of Years of Education 
-  E11103$$  Employment Level of Individual 
drn,drs,drw  L11101$$    State of Residence 
-  E11101$$    Annual Work Hours of Individual 







 year of questionnaire 
Cross sectional individual weighting 
factor 
calculated variables       
exp D11101$$-D11109$$-6     
hwage I11110$$/E11101$$     
ysm erhebj-immiyear     
ageimmi age-ysm     
d06,d96,d86,d76,d66 
cohorts calculated with 
immiyear    
variables from other data 
sources       
HVPI  
Source: Deutsche 
Bundesbank    
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Table A2: Complete regression results for table 5 
   lhwage  lhwage, using age-education deflator  lhwage, using percentile deflator 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ex  0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 
 (14.81)***  (14.86)*** (14.91)*** (13.84)*** (15.34)*** (15.31)***  (15.35)*** (13.98)*** (14.63)*** (14.67)*** (14.73)*** (13.63)*** 
ex²  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (12.55)***  (12.61)*** (12.64)*** (11.67)*** (12.84)*** (12.83)***  (12.85)*** (11.57)*** (12.25)*** (12.30)*** (12.34)*** (11.33)*** 
di1  -0.165 -0.183 -0.183 -0.171 -0.329 -0.352 -0.352 -0.344 -0.163 -0.182 -0.181 -0.167 
  (1.68)* (1.82)* (1.82)* (1.69)*  (3.90)***  (4.09)***  (4.06)***  (3.87)***  (1.57)  (1.71)* (1.70)*  (1.56) 
di2  -0.116 -0.117 -0.116 -0.116 -0.158 -0.160 -0.160 -0.160 -0.120 -0.122 -0.121 -0.121 
  (5.04)*** (5.09)*** (5.07)*** (5.08)*** (7.11)*** (7.17)*** (7.16)*** (7.16)*** (5.24)*** (5.28)*** (5.25)*** (5.26)*** 
di4  0.139 0.144 0.144 0.143 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.140 
  (4.06)*** (4.23)*** (4.25)*** (4.19)***  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (3.96)*** (4.13)*** (4.16)*** (4.09)*** 
di5  0.068 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.070 
  (2.37)** (2.36)** (2.30)** (2.33)**  (1.53)  (1.53)  (1.48)  (1.49)  (2.43)** (2.43)** (2.36)** (2.39)** 
di6  0.460 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.507 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.499 0.498 0.498 0.499 
 (21.80)***  (21.75)*** (21.79)*** (21.84)*** (24.20)*** (24.17)***  (24.22)*** (24.24)*** (21.97)*** (21.93)*** (22.00)*** (22.05)*** 
dm  0.122 0.125 0.123 0.122 0.114 0.117 0.116 0.115 0.127 0.130 0.128 0.127 
  (6.20)*** (6.32)*** (6.19)*** (6.17)*** (5.98)*** (6.13)*** (5.99)*** (5.98)*** (6.24)*** (6.36)*** (6.23)*** (6.22)*** 
dc96  0.165 0.173 0.173 0.173 -0.029  -0.020  -0.020  -0.020 0.017 0.025 0.025 0.025 
  (8.91)***  (9.17)***  (9.18)***  (9.18)***  (1.61) (1.08) (1.09) (1.08) (0.87) (1.27) (1.26) (1.28) 
dc06  0.112  0.129  0.127  0.128 -0.042 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.098 -0.080 -0.083 -0.082 
  (5.34)*** (5.86)*** (5.78)*** (5.82)***  (2.04)**  (1.03)  (1.11)  (1.09)  (4.57)*** (3.59)*** (3.69)*** (3.66)*** 
dn  -0.406 -  -  - -0.413 -  -  - -0.417 -  -  - 
  (4.02)***      (4.22)***       (4.06)***     
ex*dn  - - -  0.008  - - -  0.004  - - -  0.009 
      (0.79)        (0.54)      (0.87) 
ex²*dn  - - -  -0.000  - - -  -0.000  - - -  -0.000 
      (0.91)        (0.69)      (1.02) 
ysm  0.036 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.038 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.037 0.026 0.026 0.023 
  (2.11)** (1.58)  (1.57)  (1.46) (2.30)** (1.64)  (1.63)  (1.54) (2.05)** (1.52)  (1.50)  (1.39) 
ysm²  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.78)* (1.83)* (1.81)* (1.74)* (1.94)*  (1.98)**  (1.95)* (1.88)* (1.68)* (1.72)* (1.69)*  (1.61) 34 
 
ysm³  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.88)*  (2.08)** (2.05)** (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.23)** (2.20)** (2.17)**  (1.74)*  (1.92)*  (1.89)*  (1.87)* 
drs  -  - 0.009  0.009 -  - 0.008  0.009 -  - 0.014  0.015 
     (0.48)  (0.49)        (0.47)  (0.48)    (0.77)  (0.78) 
drn  - -  -0.039  -0.039  - -  -0.037  -0.036  - -  -0.040  -0.040 
     (1.79)*  (1.79)*      (1.71)*  (1.71)*    (1.78)*  (1.79)* 
d66  - -0.075  -0.086  -0.137 - -0.042  -0.051 -0.086  -  -0.080 -0.092 -0.147 
    (1.91)* (1.87)* (1.90)*      (2.01)**  (1.96)*  (1.96)**    (1.83)* (1.79)* (1.81)* 
d76  - -0.186  -0.193  -0.241 - -0.146  -0.152 -0.176  -  -0.191 -0.199 -0.250 
   (1.63)  (1.68)*  (1.69)*     (1.30)  (1.35)  (1.33)  (1.63)  (1.68)*  (1.70)* 
d86  - -0.156  -0.159  -0.215 - -0.149  -0.152 -0.181  -  -0.162 -0.167 -0.227 
   (0.59)  (0.64)  (0.50)    (0.05)  (0.01) (0.10)    (0.52) (0.58) (0.40) 
d96  - -0.362  -0.361  -0.413 - -0.360  -0.358 -0.385  -  -0.372 -0.371 -0.426 
    (2.94)*** (2.79)*** (2.89)***      (3.61)*** (3.46)*** (3.52)***    (2.90)*** (2.73)*** (2.84)*** 
d06  - -0.494  -0.496  -0.558 - -0.493  -0.494 -0.526  -  -0.521 -0.523 -0.591 
   (1.77)*  (1.72)*  (1.80)*      (2.07)**  (2.02)**  (2.07)**    (1.96)**  (1.90)*  (2.00)** 
dstay  - -0.049  -0.049  -0.049 - -0.051  -0.051 -0.052  -  -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 
   (1.34)  (1.35)  (1.38)    (1.51)  (1.51) (1.53)    (1.26) (1.26) (1.29) 
constant  1.627 1.622 1.628 1.635 1.634 1.628 1.633 1.637 1.608 1.602 1.605 1.613 
 (39.38)***  (39.30)*** (38.59)*** (36.43)*** (40.34)*** (40.25)***  (39.27)*** (36.70)*** (38.40)*** (38.31)*** (37.45)*** (35.34)*** 
Observations  8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 8754 
adj.  R-squared  0.297 0.299 0.300 0.300 0.311 0.313 0.314 0.314 0.279 0.281 0.282 0.282 
AIC  11627 11607 11597 11597 11542 11517 11508 11511 12273 12253 12241 12240 
8.68 2.13 2.12 2.34 9.85 2.11 2.10 2.24 8.28 1.75 1.75 2.03  Wald test for 
significance of ysm 
ysm²  ysm³  (0.000) (0.094) (0.095) (0.071) (0.000) (0.097) (0.098) (0.081) (0.000) (0.154) (0.155) (0.108) 
- - -  0.53  - - -  0.37  - - -  0.71  Wald test for 
significance of ex*dn 
ex²*dn        (0.5877)           (0.693)           (0.493) 
Note.- Robust t statistics in parentheses, for Wald test p-values, respectively. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights.35 
 
Table A3: Complete regression results for table 6 
  lhwage  lhwage, using age-education deflator lhwage, using percentile deflator
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ex 0.058  0.057  0.057  0.057  0.058  0.057 
 (14.99)***  (13.88)*** (15.41)***  (14.04)***  (14.80)***  (13.66)*** 
ex² -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (12.73)***  (11.70)*** (12.90)***  (11.63)***  (12.42)***  (11.36)*** 
di1 -0.174  -0.171  -0.339  -0.344  -0.172  -0.166 
 (1.75)*  (1.66)*  (3.97)***  (3.78)***  (1.64)  (1.53) 
di2 -0.117  -0.117  -0.160  -0.160  -0.122  -0.121 
 (5.10)***  (5.08)***  (7.17)***  (7.16)***  (5.29)***  (5.26)*** 
di4 0.143  0.143  0.003  0.003  0.141  0.141 
 (4.18)***  (4.21)***  (0.09)  (0.09)  (4.09)***  (4.13)*** 
di5 0.068  0.067  0.044  0.043  0.072  0.070 
 (2.38)**  (2.34)**  (1.55)  (1.51)  (2.44)**  (2.40)** 
di6 0.458  0.456  0.506  0.504  0.497  0.496 
 (21.71)***  (21.73)*** (24.11)***  (24.13)***  (21.89)***  (21.95)*** 
Dm 0.122  0.122  0.114  0.115  0.124  0.128 
 (6.20)***  (6.18)***  (5.97)***  (5.94)***  (6.25)***  (6.24)*** 
dc96 0.167  0.171  -0.027  -0.023  0.019  0.023 
 (9.03)***  (9.14)***  (1.50)  (1.27)  (0.99)  (1.20) 
dc06 0.116  0.122  -0.039  -0.033  -0.094  -0.088 
 (5.53)***  (5.80)***  (1.89)*  (1.62)  (4.43)***  (4.13)*** 
Dic -0.262  -0.098  -0.277  -0.125  -0.265  -0.167 
 (2.68)***  (0.59)  (2.89)***  (0.75)  (2.66)***  (0.94) 
Dtur -0.385  -0.475  -0.389  -0.511  -0.402  -0.489 
 (3.65)***  (1.84)*  (3.76)***  (2.14)**  (3.75)***  (1.86)* 
Deg -0.399  -0.128  -0.413  -0.120  -0.412  -0.099 
 (4.29)***  (0.71)  (4.48)***  (0.65)  (4.28)***  (0.52) 
Dlic -0.554  -1.155  -0.539  -0.981  -0.571  -1.167 
 (4.96)***  (3.33)***  (5.18)***  (3.30)***  (5.07)***  (3.42)*** 
ex*dic -  -0.024  -  -0.026  -  -0.019 
   (2.24)**      (2.36)**    (1.66)* 
ex²*dic -  0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000 
   (2.13)**      (2.34)**    (1.44) 
ex*dtur -  -0.007  -  -0.004  -  -0.008 
   (0.56)      (0.36)    (0.62) 
ex²*dtur -  0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000 
   (0.90)      (0.78)    (0.93) 
ex*deg -  0.002  -  0.003  -  0.000 
   (0.14)      (0.20)    (0.03) 
ex²*deg -  -0.000  -  -0.000  -  -0.000 
   (0.13)      (0.23)    (0.01) 
ex*dlic -  0.048  -  0.031  -  0.047 
   (2.33)**      (2.16)**    (2.32)** 
ex²*dlic -  -0.001  -  -0.001  -  -0.001 
   (2.71)***      (3.02)***    (2.71)*** 
ysm   0.036  -  0.038  -  0.037  - 
 (2.24)**    (2.40)**      (2.20)**   
ysm² -0.002  -  -0.002  -  -0.002  - 
 (2.01)**    (2.14)**      (1.91)*   
ysm³ 0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000  - 36 
 
 (2.11)**    (2.24)**      (1.97)**   
ysm*dic -  0.071  -  0.083  -  0.074 
   (2.62)***      (2.88)***    (2.49)** 
ysm²*dic -  -0.003  -  -0.004  -  -0.004 
   (2.34)**      (2.66)***    (2.18)** 
ysm³*dic -  0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000 
   (2.16)**      (2.54)**    (2.01)** 
ysm*dtur -  0.070  -  0.073  -  0.075 
   (1.69)*      (1.86)*    (1.77)* 
ysm²*dtur -  -0.004  -  -0.004  -  -0.004 
   (1.86)*      (1.94)*    (1.95)* 
ysm³*dtur -  0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000 
   (2.01)**      (1.98)**    (2.09)** 
ysm_deg -  -0.015  -  -0.016  -  -0.021 
   (0.75)      (0.82)    (0.96) 
ysm²_deg -  0.001  -  0.001  -  0.001 
   (1.08)      (1.21)    (1.34) 
ysm³*deg -  -0.000  -  -0.000  -  -0.000 
   (0.94)      (1.11)    (1.26) 
ysm*dlic -  0.082  -  0.084  -  0.086 
   (1.40)      (1.53)    (1.49) 
ysm²*dlic -  -0.004  -  -0.004  -  -0.004 
   (1.18)      (1.28)    (1.24) 
ysm³*dlic -  0.000  -  0.000  -  0.000 
   (1.21)      (1.31)    (1.25) 
Dstay -  -0.058  -  -0.067  -  -0.058 
   (1.57)      (1.85)*    (1.48) 
Drs -  0.011  -  0.010  -  0.017 
   (0.60)      (0.58)    (0.89) 
Drn -  -0.036  -  -0.035  -  -0.037 
   (1.68)*      (1.65)*    (1.67)* 
Constant 1.628  1.635  1.634  1.638  1.608  1.613 
 (39.62)***  (36.41)*** (40.46)***  (36.69)***  (38.63)***  (35.32)*** 
Observations 8754  8754  8754  8754  8754  8754 
adj. R-squared  0.300  0.303 0.313  0.316  0.281  0.285 
AIC 11596  11575  11518  11503  12241  12219 
6.80 -  8.12  -  6.41  -  Wald test for 
significance of ysm ysm
2 
ysm
3 (0.000)    (0.000)      0.000  - 
- 2.74  -  3.26  -  2.87  Wald test for 
significance of ysm ysm
2 
ysm
3 for dic    (0.042)     (0.021)     (0.035) 
- 1.86  -  1.49  -  1.78  Wald test for 
significance of ysm ysm
2 
ysm
3 for dtur    (0.135)     (0.216)     (0.148) 
- 4.93  -  5.21  -  4.78  Wald test for 
significance of ysm ysm
2 
ysm
3 for deg    (0.002)     (0.001)     (0.003) 
- 4.72  -  4.74  -  4.51  Wald test for 
significance of ysm ysm
2 
ysm
3 for dlic    (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.004) 
- 2.50  -  2.81  -  1.49  Wald test for 
significance of ex*dic 
ex
2*dic    (0.082)     (0.060)     (0.225) 
- 0.98  -  1.25  -  0.88  Wald test for 
significance of ex*dtur 
ex
2*dtur    (0.375)     (0.288)     (0.415) 37 
 
- 0.01  -  0.03  -  0.00  Wald test for 
significance of ex*deg 
ex
2*deg    (0.990)     (0.969)     (0.998) 
- 4.41  -  7.33  -  4.48  Wald test for 
significance of ex*dlic 
ex
2*dlic     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.011) 
Note.- Robust t statistics in parentheses, for Wald test p-values, respectively 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
Source: Own calculation with SOEP data based on cross-section weights. 
 
 
 